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[1] Heterogeneity of subsurface environments and insufficient site characterization are
some of the reasons why decisions about groundwater exploitation and remediation have to
be made under uncertainty. A typical decision maker chooses between several alternative
remediation strategies by balancing their respective costs with the probability of their
success or failure. We conduct a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) to determine the
likelihood of the success of a permeable reactive barrier, one of the leading approaches to
groundwater remediation. While PRA is used extensively in many engineering fields, its
applications in hydrogeology are scarce. This is because rigorous PRA requires one to
quantify structural and parametric uncertainties inherent in predictions of subsurface flow
and transport. We demonstrate how PRA can facilitate a comprehensive uncertainty
quantification for complex subsurface phenomena by identifying key transport processes
contributing to a barrier’s failure, each of which is amenable to uncertainty analysis.
Probability of failure of a remediation strategy is computed by combining independent
and conditional probabilities of failure of each process. Individual probabilities can be
evaluated either analytically or numerically or, barring both, can be inferred from
expert opinion.
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1. Introduction
[2] Heterogeneity, the ubiquitous lack of complete site
characterization and conceptual-mathematical limitations of
many modeling approaches are some of the reasons render-
ing deterministic predictions of subsurface flow and trans-
port suboptimal. Quantification of these and other sources
of uncertainty is a prerequisite for modern, scientifically
defensible decision making in the areas of groundwater
exploitation and remediation. Many pressing problems,
such as the selection of a remediation strategy most likely
to succeed at a given contaminated site or the assessment
of the likelihood that supercritical carbon dioxide seques-
tered in the subsurface escapes back into the atmosphere,
cannot be reliably answered without proper uncertainty
quantification and risk analysis. When these modeling
components are ignored, the failure of engineering cam-
paigns to control the fate and migration of contaminants is
common, as is exemplified by the frequency with which
contaminant plumes bypass permeable reactive barriers
constructed at locations suggested by deterministic analyses
(Interstate Technology and Regulatory Council (ITCR),
Permeable reactive barriers: Lessons learned/new direc-
tions, 2005, available at www.itrcweb.org).
[3] While a consensus is emerging that risk analysis
must be an integral part of decision making in subsurface
hydrology, its precise operational definition is still a subject
of debate. Do a few realizations of Monte Carlo simulations
and/or a sensitivity analysis constitute a risk assessment?
Scientific disciplines where risks are routinely evaluated to
satisfy statutory requirements, e.g., nuclear power genera-
tion [National Research Council (NRC), 1983], aerospace
industry [Pate´-Cornell and Dillon, 2001], and earthquake
engineering [NRC, 1997], provide some guidance. Specif-
ically, a comprehensive risk analysis can be defined as a
procedure that enables one to answer the following three
questions: What can happen? How likely is it to happen?
Given that it occurs, what are the consequences? [Bedford
and Cooke, 2003]. The National Research Council’s report
[NRC, 1997] on seismic hazard analysis explicitly identifies
the following attributes of risk assessment (RA): (1) RAmust
be probabilistic and quantitative; (2) RA must be based on
subjective probabilities; and (3) The main focus of any prob-
abilistic RA (PRA) must be on uncertainty quantification.
[4] The reasoning behind the report is equally applicable
to subsurface hydrology. The emphasis on the quantitative
(as opposed to descriptive or qualitative) nature of PRA is
important. The realization that a statement ‘‘the contamina-
tion is likely to occur’’ is insufficient, unless accompanied
by a probability value of such an occurrence, can be traced
back toGarrick [1989] and is a fundamental tenant of modern
PRA [Bedford and Cooke, 2003]. Equally important is the
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use of subjective probabilities. Since subjective probability
P(A) is defined as ‘‘a degree of belief, of one individual, in
the occurrence of A’’ [Bedford and Cooke, 2003, p. 24], it
paves the way for incorporation of expert knowledge and
other soft data into the modeling process [NRC, 1997].
[5] A rigorous PRA framework lays out a formal proce-
dure for risk analysis, which is implemented in this study.
The procedure consists of [Vesely et al., 1981; Bedford and
Cooke, 2003] (1) identification of key components/events
(a contaminant’s release, failure of a permeable reactive
barrier to intercept the plume, etc.) contributing to a system’s
failure (aquifer contamination, escape of the sequestered
CO2 into the atmosphere, etc.); (2) construction of a fault
tree or a binary decision diagram; (3) their mathematical
representation by means of Boolean algebra, which allows
one to relate the probability of a system’s failure to that of its
critical constitutive components; and (4) computation of the
latter probabilities.
[6] Applications of this PRA procedure to distributed
physical systems include work by Tartakovsky [2007],Winter
and Tartakovsky [2008], and Bolster and Tartakovsky [2008].
(Less formal approaches to PRA in hydrogeology have also
been reported [e.g., Batchelor et al., 1998; Wang and
McTernan, 2002].) PRA of complex physical phenomena,
including subsurface flow and transport, poses a set of
challenges not routinely encountered in PRA of artificial
(engineered) systems. Chief among them is the estimation
of the probabilities of failure of individual components, i.e.,
the probabilities of the occurrence of each event. While in
manufactured systems (e.g., space shuttles or nuclear power
plants discussed above) such probabilities can often be
found in reliability databases, in hydrogeology they have
to be either computed by solving flow and transport
equations with uncertain parameters or inferred from expert
knowledge.
[7] The former option relies on Monte Carlo simulations
or other computational approaches, including moment equa-
tions, probability density function (pdf) methods, stochastic
collocation methods, and stochastic finite elements. The
second option is based on prior experience, site’s geology,
etc. The formal PRA procedure facilitates both approaches
by replacing an intractable problem of risk assessment for a
subsurface system with hundreds of uncertain parameters
with key subsystems, each of which can be characterized by
only a few uncertain parameters. When the probability of
failure of a given subsystem cannot be evaluated exactly, it
might be possible to compute its upper bound that provides
a conservative estimate of risk. These concepts are explored
in detail below.
[8] In section 2 we formulate a problem of selecting an
optimal remediation strategy by using the probability of its
success as a criterion. (Costs associated with alternative
remediation strategies, another important selection criterion,
are not considered here. They can be accounted for in a
cost-benefit analysis for which risk assessment provides
input.) We present a rigorous PRA of one popular remedi-
ation strategy, a permeable reactive barrier; probabilities of
success/failure of other remediation strategies can be eval-
uated in a similar fashion. Section 3 presents a fault tree
analysis of a typical permeable reactive barrier. Probabilities
of the occurrence of basic events in this tree are evaluated in
section 4. These are combined to compute the probability of
failure of a permeable reactive barrier in section 5. Section 6
contains a sensitivity analysis that allows one to determine
the sources of uncertainty that contribute most to the
possible remediation failure and hence need to be alleviated
by collecting more data.
2. Problem Formulation
[9] Consider a contaminant plume traveling from a (point
or distributed) contamination source Ws toward a region Wp
that has to be protected from contamination (Figure 1). The
protected region Wp represents a river, municipal wells, etc;
Ws represents either an actual or potential source of con-
tamination. The plume is driven by a field-scale hydraulic
head gradient J(t), whose temporal variability is caused by
seasonal fluctuations in precipitation, seasonal variations in
groundwater pumping, artificial groundwater recharge, etc.
In field-scale applications, J(t) is routinely inferred from
water level data, e.g., by means of three-point estimators
[Silliman and Frost, 1998]. Alternatively, it can be computed
by solving flow equations with uncertain hydraulic conduc-
tivity, boundary conditions, etc.
[10] Our goal is to select a remediation strategy that would
prevent contamination ofWp. Typical selection criteria are the
construction, operation and maintenance costs and the like-
lihood of success or, equivalently, the probability of failure.
In this study, we concentrate on the latter aspect of risk
assessment applied to a permeable reactive barrier (Wb in
Figure 1) and natural attenuation; other remediation strate-
gies can be analyzed in a similar manner.
[11] Contaminant migration toward Wp can take one of the
three paths shown in Figure 1, either bypassing the permeable
Figure 1. A schematic representation of the aquifer
remediation problem. A potential source of contamination
is located at Ws. Driven by hydraulic gradient J(t), a con-
taminant plume migrates toward region Wp, which one aims
to protect by constructing a permeable reactive barrier Wb.
Three alternative paths of the plume migration are denoted
by PATH 1, PATH 2, and PATH 3.
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reactive barrier or being intercepted by it. It is in acknowl-
edging the possibility of each of these scenarios that
uncertainty quantification becomes an indispensable com-
ponent, or the main focus, of risk assessment. If the
hydraulic head gradient J and the aquifer’s hydraulic and
transport properties were all known with certainty, one
would not talk about risk: a properly constructed reactive
barrier would accomplish its task, as similar barriers do in
a controlled laboratory setting. In actual applications, esti-
mates and future predictions of J are subject to error,
aquifers are heterogeneous, and site-specific data are scarce.
These and other sources of uncertainty have to be quantified
if one were to have any notion of the likelihood of the
success of a remediation strategy.
[12] Depending on the application, various definitions of
success or failure are possible. We say that a remediation
effort failed if a contaminant’s aqueous concentration C(x, t)
at any point x 2 Wp exceeds some prespecified value C*
within a legally mandated time interval t  T. The value of
C* is typically determined by environmental regulations, for
example as a variable in the excess lifetime cancer risk
(ELCR) [U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1992].
Other (uncertain) variables in ELCR characterize water
use (ingestion, inhalation, etc.) and population (age, body
weight, etc.) [Tartakovsky, 2007]. Analysis of these factors
lies outside the scope of the present analysis, but can be
readily accounted for if relevant statistics are available.
[13] To sum up, we formulate the problem of risk assess-
ment for a permeable reactive barrier as follows. Given
measurements of hydraulic and transport properties of
an aquifer and field-scale hydraulic head gradient, deter-
mine the probability of failure of a reactive barrier to
prevent contaminant’s aqueous concentration C(x, t) from
exceeding the mandated concentration C* for all x 2 Wp
and t  T.
[14] It is worthwhile noting that this problem is the
opposite of another remediation problem in which Wp
represents a catchment zone of a pump-and-treat remedia-
tion effort. In this case, one would estimate the risk of a
contaminant plume bypassing Wp. The results of the anal-
ysis below are equally applicable to this problem, after Wb
and the corresponding calculations are eliminated.
3. Fault Tree Analysis
[15] Risk analysis starts with the identification of basic
events that can lead to the system failure (SF), i.e., to the
aqueous concentration C(x, t) exceeding the mandated
concentration C* for all x 2 Wp and t  T. The basic events
of relevance to our analysis are listed in Table 1. The
initiating event is the occurrence of a spill or multiple spills
(SO). One can be uncertain about this event for a variety of
reasons: How likely is a spill to occur? If it has already
occurred, what its total mass and duration? Etc. Subsequent
events are determined by possible paths of contaminant
migration. Event P3 occurs if the contaminant plume is
intercepted by the permeable reactive barrier (PATH 3 in
Figure 1). Event P2 occurs if the plume bypasses the
reactive barrier Wb and enters the protected zone Wp (PATH 2
in Figure 1). Event P1 is associated with PATH 1, in which
the plume bypasses both the reactive barrier Wb and the
protected zone Wp. It does not lead to system failure, since it
cannot change contaminant concentration in Wp. (This
reasoning highlights the importance of unambiguous defi-
nition of system failure. Alternatively, one could say that
the system failed if concentration C at any point in the
aquifer exceeds a threshold concentration C* or if the
contaminant retains the ability to reach Wp at times t > T.
The contribution of event P1 to the system failure thus
defined would have a finite probability.) Event P1 is clearly
a reciprocal of the events P2 and P3 in the sense that the
probability of its occurrence, P[P1] = 1  P[P2]  P[P3] is
completely determined by P[P2] and P[P3] the probabilities
of occurrence of events P2 and P3, respectively. For this
reason, event P1 is not explicitly included in the risk
assessment.
[16] Contaminant migration along either PATH 2 or
PATH 3 does not necessarily lead to system failure. First,
natural attenuation, which we define as ‘‘the combination of
natural biological, chemical, and physical processes that act
without human intervention to reduce the mass, toxicity,
mobility, or concentration of the contaminants’’ [Alvarez
and Illman, 2006, p. 569], can reduce the contaminant
concentration C to levels below C* by the time the plume
reaches Wp. Event NA corresponds to the failure of natural
attenuation to achieve this reduction within a time interval
t 2 [0, T]. Finally, if the contaminant plume travels along
PATH 3 we must account for event RE, the possibility that
the reactive barrier Wb fails to achieve the required reduction
of the contaminant concentration C. In this scenario, natural
attenuation acts in conjunction with the remediation effort.
[17] The next step in PRA is to construct a fault tree
[Bedford and Cooke, 2003; Tartakovsky, 2007], which
relates system failure to the occurrence of the basic events
identified above. The fault tree for the problem under con-
sideration is shown in Figure 2. The Boolean operators
AND and OR indicate a collection of basic events that
would lead to failure. The fault tree in Figure 2 enables
one to identify the minimal cut sets, the smallest collec-
tions of events that must occur jointly in order for the
system to fail. In our case, there are two such sets: {SO,
P2, NA} and {SO, P3, NA, RE}. Finally, we use these
minimal cut sets to represent the fault tree in terms of the
Boolean operators,
SF ¼ SOAND ½ðP2AND NAÞ OR ðP3AND NAAND REÞ: ð1Þ
[18] Since SO is independent of the other events, it
follows from (1) that the probability of system failure is
given by
P½SF ¼ P½P2 \ NAP½SO þ P½P3 \ RE \ NAP½SO: ð2Þ
Table 1. Glossary of Event Abbreviations
Event Abbreviation
System failure SF
Spill occurs SO
Path 1 P1
Path 2 P2
Natural attenuation fails NA
Path 3 P3
Remediation effort fails RE
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where X \ Y = X AND Y and X [ Y = X OR Y. It remains to
compute the probabilities of the basic events in (2).
4. Probabilities of Basic Events
[19] The fault tree analysis resulting in (2) allows one to
replace an intractable task of computing P[SF] as a solution
of flow and (reactive) transport equations with a large
number of uncertain parameters, with a manageable task
of identifying the probabilities of basic events. Many of
these events have been analyzed earlier in other contexts.
Others are specific enough to be amenable to an expert
analysis based on previous experience. Both approaches are
combined below for the complete evaluation of P[SF].
4.1. Probability of PATH 2
[20] We define P[P2] as the probability that the plume’s
center of mass m = (mx, my)
T reaches the protected zone Wp
without ever having passed through the reactive barrier Wb,
P½P2  P½mðt0Þ 62 Wb;mðtÞ 2 Wp; 0 < t0 < t < T : ð3aÞ
[21] To simplify the presentation and without any loss of
generality, we take the reactive barrier Wb to be parallel
to the protected zone Wp and align them with the x axis
(Figure 3). The source Ws is reduced to a point and located
at (x, y) = (0, 0). Furthermore, we assume that the thickness
in the x direction is small compared to the extension in the
y direction. Then the domains Wi (i = b, p) are represented
by the collections of points with coordinates xi = Li and yi
2 [yimin, yimax]; Lb and Lp denote the distances from the
source of contamination Ws to the reactive barrier Wb and
the protected zone Wp, respectively; tb is the travel time
of the plume’s center of mass between x = 0 and x = Lb, tp is
the travel time from x = Lb to x = Lp. This allows us to
replace (3a) with
P½P2 ¼ P½myðtbÞ 62 Wb;myðtb þ tpÞ 2 Wp; 0 < tp þ tb < T :
ð3bÞ
[22] Let p12(yp, tp + tb; yb, tb) = p2(yp, tp + tbjy1, tb)p1(yb, tb)
denote the joint pdf describing the random event {my(tb) = yb;
my(tp + tb) = yp}, where p12(yp, tp + tbjyb, tb) is the pdf for
the event {my(tp + tb) = yp} conditioned on the occurrence of
the event {my(tb) = yb} and p1(yb, tb) is the pdf for the event
{my(tb) = yb}; the joint distribution of travel times tb and tp is
denoted by fpb(tp, tb). Note that yb and yp are points in the
planes x = Lb and x = Lp, respectively, because tb and tp
denote the travel times to these planes. Now we can write
down the joint probability P12(yp 2 Wp, tp + tb; yb 2 Wb, tb)
that yp 2 Wp and yb 2 Wb,
P12ðyp 2 Wp; tp þ tb; yb 2 Wb; tbÞ
¼
Z
Wp
Z
Wb
p12ðyp; tp þ tb; yb; tbÞdybdyp
¼
Z
Wp
Z
Wb
p2ðyp; tp þ tbjyb; tbÞp1ðyb; tbÞdybdyp; ð4Þ
where Wb is the complement of Wb. Integration over the
travel times then gives P[P2] as
P½P2 ¼
ZT
0
ZTtp
0
fpbðtp; tbÞ
 P12ðyp 2 Wp; tp þ tb; yb 2 Wb; tbÞdtbdtp: ð5Þ
[23] The unknown pdf’s p1 and p2 encapsulate uncertain-
ty about the locations at which the center of mass crosses
the planes x = Lb and x = Lp, respectively. In the absence of
site-specific data and/or as a prior, one can select these
distributions to be Gaussian. A choice of prior variances
reflects one’s expectation about the magnitude of the plume’s
deviation from the direction of mean flow (Figure 3).
Information about site geology, local transmissivity, hydrau-
lic head, contaminant concentration, etc can then be used to
compute the posterior pdf’s p1 and p2 through various
parametric inference strategies.
Figure 2. Fault tree for remediation effort.
Figure 3. Coordinate system and probability density
functions (pdf’s) of the center of mass at x = Lb and x = Lp.
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[24] The analysis of Dentz and Carrera [2003] supports
the notion that pdf’s p1 and p2 might indeed be Gaussian.
In the following, we treat the hydraulic head gradient J(t) as
the only source of uncertainty (modeling it as a Gaussian
random process). We focus on times larger than the corre-
lation time of J(t), denoted by tv, so that the process m(t)
can be assumed Markovian. This is done so that the path of
the plume can be split into two distinct parts without history
effects (i.e., the trajectory of the plume from the plane in
which the barrier lies to the protection zone, is independent
of the trajectory from the spill zone to the barrier plane).
According to the analysis of Dentz and Carrera [2003],
p1(yb, tb) and p12(yp, tp + tbjyb, tb) are given by
p1ðyb; tbÞ ¼ 1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
4pDcmtb
p exp  y
2
b
4Dcmtb
 
ð6aÞ
pðyp; tp þ tbjyb; tbÞ ¼ 1ffiffiffiffiffi
2p
p
Dcmtp
exp ðyp  ybÞ
2
4Dcmtp
" #
; ð6bÞ
where
Dcm ¼ Dlocal þ v2s2vtv: ð6cÞ
[25] The dispersion coefficient Dcm provides a measure of
the temporal increase of uncertainty in the center of mass
position due to fluctuations of the head gradient that adds to
the local dispersion coefficient Dlocal (as the center of mass
of the plume does not diffuse, this is zero); v is the ensemble
mean velocity, sv
2 the variance of the gradient fluctuations.
Travel time tb is the time it takes the plume to migrate from
the source of contamination to (xb, yb). It can either be
approximated by the mean travel time tb  Lb/v or treated as
a random variable whose statistics are coupled to trajectory
moments [Sanchez-Vila and Guadagnini, 2005; Riva et al.,
2006].
[26] Note that because of the Markovianity of the under-
lying random process, the joint distribution of travel times,
fpb(tp, tb) factorizes according to
fpbðtp; tbÞ ¼ f ðLp; tpÞ f ðLb; tbÞ: ð7Þ
[27] Here we can determine the travel time distributions
explicitly. The distribution of travel times to reach a control
plane at x = L is given by
f ðt; LÞ ¼ Lþ vt
2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
4pDcmt3
p exp ðL vtÞ
2
4Dcmt
" #
: ð8Þ
The cumulative travel time distribution is given by
Fðt; LÞ ¼
Z t
0
f ðt0; LÞdt0 ¼ 1
2
þ 1
2
erf
vt  Lffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
4Dcmt
p
 
: ð9Þ
The travel time mean and variance are given by
tL ¼ L
v
þ D
cm
v2
; s2tL ¼ 2
L
v
Dcm
v2
þ 5D
cm
v4
: ð10Þ
[28] In the following we consider situations for which
L/vDcm/v2 so that the travel timemean and variance can be
approximated by
tL  L
v
; s2tL ¼ 2
LDcm
v3
: ð11Þ
For simplicity, in the following, we assume that the control
time T is much larger than the standard deviations stLi (i =
b, p). Thus, we can approximate the travel time distribution
f(Li, ti) by a delta distribution
f ðL; tÞ  d t  L
v
 
: ð12Þ
Substituting (6a)–(6c), (7) and (12) into (4) and (5) yields
P½P2 ¼ 1
2psbsp
Zypmax
ypmin
Zybmin
1
exp  y
2
b
2s2b
 
 exp ðyp  ybÞ
2
2s2p
" #
dybdyp
þ 1
2psbsp
Zypmax
ypmin
Zybmin
1
exp  y
2
b
2s2b
 
 exp ðyp  ybÞ
2
2s2p
" #
dybdyp; ð13Þ
where we define si
2 = 2Dcmti for i = b, p.
[29] It is worthwhile emphasizing that the probability
estimate (13) ignores heterogeneity as a source of uncer-
tainty and risk. It can be extended to mildly heterogeneous
aquifers (without dominant preferential flow paths) by
replacing spatially varying transmissivity T(x) and porosity
f(x) with their effective values Teff and feff, respectively.
Then the statistics of macroscopic flow velocity v can be
obtained from those of hydraulic head gradient J by using
Darcy’s law v = (Teff /feff)J. Expressions for the effective
hydraulic properties of heterogeneous aquifers can be found
in work by Dagan [1989] and Tartakovsky and Neuman
[1998], among others.
[30] Preferential flow paths (e.g., paleochannels) can
redirect the plume around the reactive barrier, significantly
affecting the probability estimate P[P2] [e.g., Korte,
2001].The likelihood of the existence of dominant prefer-
ential flow paths can be elucidated from expert opinion of
the kind we discuss in section 5. In the present analysis we
assume that the occurrence of preferential flow paths was
deemed unlikely, i.e., that the probability estimate (13) with
the generalization described above is valid.
4.2. Probability of PATH 3
[31] We define P[P3] as the probability that the center of
mass of the plume enters the protected region Wp after
having passed through the reactive barrier Wb. In analogy
with (3b),
P½P3 ¼ P½myðtbÞ 2 Wb;myðtb þ tpÞ 2 Wp; 0 < tp þ tb < T :
ð14Þ
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The reasoning presented for the probability of PATH 2
leads to the probability of occurrence of P3 in a mildly
heterogeneous aquifer given by
P½P3 ¼ 1
2psbsp
Zypmax
ypmin
Zybmax
ybmin
exp  y
2
b
2s2b
 
 exp ðyp  ybÞ
2
2s2p
" #
dybdyp: ð15Þ
4.3. Probability of Natural Attenuation Failure
[32] Natural attenuation (NA) has a potential to reduce
contaminant concentration C below the threshold value C*
regardless of whether the plume takes PATH 2 or PATH 3.
The probability of failure of NA to do so is estimated below
for both paths.
4.3.1. P[NA] Along PATH 2
[33] The probability of failure of NA of a plume traveling
along PATH 2 corresponds to the first minimal cut set in (2),
P½P2 \ NA ¼ P½NAjP2P½P2: ð16Þ
The conditional probability in (16) can be defined as
P½NAjP2 ¼ P½CP2peakðx 2 Wp; t  TÞ > C*jP2; ð17Þ
where Cpeak
P2 is the maximum concentration, and C* is the
concentration threshold value. Assuming a Gaussian shape
for the concentration distribution, the peak concentration is
given by
CP2peakðtÞ ¼
C0 exp lNAt½ 
4pt
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
D
eff
L D
eff
T
q : ð18Þ
[34] Here DL
eff and DT
eff are the longitudinal and transverse
effective dispersion coefficients, lNA is a natural attenuation
degradation coefficient, and C0 is an initial concentration.
We take C0 to be constant and deterministic, but our
methodology can be extended to include uncertainty in
the initial concentration. It is also worthwhile emphasizing
that the methodology presented here is equally applicable to
two and three spatial dimensions.
[35] In homogeneous aquifers, the effective dispersion
coefficients DL
ef and DT
eff coincide with their local counter-
parts. Heterogeneity complicates the analysis [e.g., Gelhar
and Axness, 1983; Dagan, 1988; Kitanidis, 1988; Dentz et
al., 2000] and appropriate effective dispersion coeffi-
cients should be used [e.g., Dagan, 1989]. For short
travel distances, the use of the local dispersion coeffi-
cients in (18) yields a conservative estimate of the peak
concentration.
[36] Since the peak concentration Cpeak
P2 in (18) decreases
monotonically with time t, one can rewrite (17) as
P½NAjP2 ¼ P½x 2 Wp; tpeak < t*jP2; ð19Þ
where tpeak is the arrival time of Cpeak, and t* is obtained as
a solution of the equation
CP2peakðt*Þ ¼ C*: ð20Þ
We quantify the arrival time of the peak concentration by the
arrival time distribution of the center of mass (8). It follows
from (19) and (9) that
P½NAjP2 ¼
Zt*
0
f ðtpeak ; LP2Þdtpeak ¼ Fðt*; LP2 Þ: ð21Þ
Note that LP2 is some characteristic length of the plume
trajectory withinP2, whose precise value needs to be selected
on the basis of expert opinion. A conservative estimate might
be the shortest distance, which would provide for a worst case
scenario.
4.3.2. P[NA] Along PATH 3
[37] The probability of failure of NA of a plume traveling
along PATH 3 corresponds to the second minimal cut set
in (2),
P½P3 \ RE \ NA ¼ P½NAjP3 \ REP½REjP3P½P3: ð22Þ
The reasoning used in the section above leads to
P½NAjRE \ P3 ¼ P½CP3peakðx 2 Wp; t  TÞ > C*jRE;P3; ð23Þ
where
CP3peakðtÞ ¼
C0 exp lNAðt DtREÞ  lREDtRE½ 
4pt
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
D
eff
L D
eff
T
q : ð24Þ
[38] Here lRE is a decay coefficient associated with the
reactive barrier and DtRE is the residence time of the solute
plume moving through the barrier. The latter can be
estimated as
DtRE ¼ w=v; ð25Þ
where w is the width of the reactive barrier in the flow
direction. In analogy to (19), (23) and (24) give rise to
P½NAjRE \ P3 ¼ P½x 2 Wp; tpeak < t^jRE;P3; ð26Þ
where t^ is a solution of
CP3peak ð^tÞ ¼ C*: ð27Þ
[39] In analogy to (21), we obtain
P½NAjRE \ P3 ¼ F ð^t; LP3 Þ: ð28Þ
[40] Note that the characteristic length of the plume
trajectory LP3 differs from that of P2. Again, the selection
of this property should be based on expert knowledge and a
conservative estimate would be the minimum trajectory
between the contaminated source and the protection area
that circumvents the reactive barrier.
4.4. Probability of Reactive Barrier Failure
[41] There are many reasons why a permeable reactive
barrier (PRB) might fail (Federal Remediation Technologies
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Roundtable, Evaluation of permeable reactive barrier per-
formance, 2002, available at http://www.clu-in.org/download/
rtdf/2-prbperformance_web.pdf). One of them, failure to
intercept a contaminant plume, has been considered above.
Others that must be considered include (1) preferential flow
paths through the barrier that can cause rapid local depletion
of reactive substances [Elder et al., 2002], (2) reactive per-
formance decline where the barrier becomes passive before
the entire mass of reactant is used up (ITCR, www.itrcweb.
org), (3) microbial growth that can impede flow [e.g.,
Gavaskar et al., 2002; Wilkin and Puls, 2003; Gu et al.,
2002], and (4) tidal fluctuations that can affect performance
of reactive barriers in coastal regions [e.g., Ludwig et al.,
2002].
[42] Some sources of uncertainty associated with the
performance of PRBs can be related mathematically to
the uncertainty in hydraulic and reactive properties of
PRBs. For example, uncertainty about kinetic reaction
rates and/or flow velocity through a barrier can be quan-
tified in a way that provides a full pdf for solute concen-
tration exiting the barrier [Tartakovsky et al., 2009]. Rather
than attempting to do so, we employ past performance
to estimate the probability of a barrier’s failure P[RE],
a procedure that allows us to demonstrate how expert
knowledge can be incorporated into probabilistic risk
analysis.
[43] ITCR (www.itrcweb.org) reviews 200 applications
of PRBs. Henderson and Desmond [2007] found sufficient
specific public information on field operation conditions
and performance issues for 40 of the ITRC 200 cases. They
identified three main reason for failure: adverse loss of
reactivity (1 case), adverse hydraulic changes (2 cases) and
bad design (37 cases). The data of ITCR (www.itrcweb.org)
and Henderson and Desmond [2007] suggest that 25% of
all reported cases where PRBs had performance issues are
attributable to event PATH 2, i.e., to a plume or its sig-
nificant part having missed the reactive barrier. Therefore
30 of the 200 cases can be said to have failed after passing
through a reactive barrier. This leads us to estimate the
probability of failure as
P½REjP3 ¼ 0:15: ð29Þ
[44] A few comments about the veracity of the estimate
(29) are in order. First, some authors [e.g., Wilkin and Puls,
2003; Henderson and Desmond, 2007] have argued that
both the number of case studies currently available and the
relatively short periods of experimentation hamper the
assessment of the long-term performance of PRBs, and that
more information is needed for more accurate long-term
predictions. From a PRA perspective this is acceptable as
probabilities used in PRAs are subjective, and one can
change the probabilities of failure as more information
becomes available. Second, it is worthwhile putting the
probability estimate (29) into a broader perspective. While
the 15% probability of failure might seem high, it compares
favorably with the reliability of other remediation techni-
ques. For example, a study of pump-and-treat remediation
[NRC, 1994] identified that at 69 of the 77 sites the system
was deemed to have failed. Finally, since many of the cases
where the PRBs can be attributed to bad design, it is
expected that this number will decrease significantly with
increased knowledge and experience.
5. Probability of System Failure
[45] The probability of failure of a permeable reactive
barrier remediation effort (2) reads in terms of the previ-
ously determined probabilities
P½SF
P½SO ¼ P½NAjP2P½P2 þ P½NAjRE \ P3  P½REjP3P½P3;
ð30Þ
where P[NAjP2] given by (21), P[P2] by (13), P[NAjRE \
P3] by (28), P[REjP3] by (29) and P[P3] by (15). The
cumulative travel time distribution F(t, L) of the center of
mass positions is given by (9).
[46] This closed-form analytical solution provides a prob-
abilistic description of a complex reactive transport phe-
nomenon and can be used to analyze rare events. This is in
contrast with a vast majority of existing stochastic analyses,
including Monte Carlo simulations, which predict the mean
behavior of a system and quantify predictive uncertainty
through corresponding (co)variances. PRA facilitates the
uncertainty quantification by taking a system’s approach in
which a complex system with many uncertain parameters is
subdivided into a set of constitutive components (basic
events), each of which has fewer parameters.
[47] The derivation of the analytical estimate (30) of
the probability of failure of a remediation effort required
some level of abstraction. This estimate can be refined by
conducting numerical analyses of the system’s components.
Numerical tools one would employ for such analyses
(Monte Carlo simulations, particle tracking, etc.) become
much more tractable because of significant reductions in the
number of uncertain parameters and degrees of freedom.
6. Sensitivity Analysis
[48] The probability of remediation effort failure (30)
depends on a number of geometrical (the length of a reactive
barrier 2W, the distance between the source of contamination
and the barrier Lb, etc.) and the statistical (mean, variance,
and correlation of temporal fluctuations of hydraulic head
gradient, etc.) parameters, as well as on effective hydraulic
and transport properties (effective hydraulic conductivity,
porosity, dispersion coefficients, etc.). To discern the influ-
ence of these parameters on risk assessment, we conduct
a sensitivity analysis. We start by normalizing geometric
characteristics with L, the distance from the source of
contamination to the protected region (L = Lb + Lp), and
time with the correlation time lv. Some of the key dimen-
sionless quantities arising from such a normalization are
k ¼ vtv
L
; a ¼ Lb
L
; t*d ¼
t*
tv
; t^d ¼ t
**
tv
ð31aÞ
l*P2 ¼
LP2
L
; l*P3 ¼
LP3
L
; w^ ¼ W
L
: ð31bÞ
[49] We set the coordinate system y = 0 at the center of
the reaction barrier. If the barrier’s dimensionless length is
W06413 BOLSTER ET AL.: PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT
7 of 10
W06413
2w^, this gives ybmin = w^ and ybmax = w^ and sets the mean
(expected) locations of the center of mass to mb = 0 and
mp = 0.
[50] To investigate the influence of various parameters on
the probability of failure we set sv = 1, k = 0.1, a = 0.5, w^ =
0.125, y2min = 0.5, y2max = 0.5, t*d = 100, t^d = 100, lP2 =
1.1, and lP3 = 1, and then vary one parameter at the time.
[51] The probability of failure of the remediation effort
increases monotonically with a, the relative distance
between the reactive barrier and the source of contamination
(Figure 4). This reflects the fact that the larger the distance a
contaminant plume travels before reaching the plane where
the barrier is located, the greater the likelihood of the plume
bypassing the reactive barrier.
[52] Figure 5 shows that the probability of remediation
failure decreases with the barrier’s length 2w^. Such a
decrease is, of course, to be expected as wider barriers are
more likely to intercept a plume. The added value of this
calculation is that it quantifies the risk, thus facilitating
decision making (e.g., a cost benefit analysis). For example,
one can see that increasing the barrier’s length beyond w^ =
0.5 does not really reduce the probability of remediation
failure, making the added expense unnecessary.
[53] Figure 6 reveals a nearly step-like dependence of the
probability of remediation failure on the (normalized) time
t*d it takes natural attenuation to reduce contaminant con-
centration to acceptable levels. For t*d smaller than some
critical value (tcr  10 for the parameters used in Figure 6)
natural attenuation alone is sufficient, contamination will
be unlikely to occur regardless of whether a reactive bar-
rier is operational, so that P[SF] = 0.04. For t*d > tcr, the
probability of remediation failure rapidly approaches its
maximum value (P[SF]  0.51 for the parameters used in
Figure 6). For small t*d, failure can still occur if the plume
arrives faster than this time, which is determined by the
statistics of the velocity field. At larger t*d, it depends on
the probability that the plume misses the protection zone
or that the reactive barrier is successful. This suggests
that a detailed assessment of the natural attenuation time is
not necessary as long as one can be reasonably sure that
t*d  tct or t*d  tct. The dependance of probability of
failure on t^d is similar.
[54] Figures 7 and 8 elucidate the degree to which
uncertainty in temporal fluctuations of hydraulic head
gradient and, hence, macroscopic velocity affect the prob-
ability of remediation failure. Large temporal fluctuations,
as quantified by high dimensionless variance s^ (Figure 7)
and/or small dimensionless correlation length (the Kubo
number k) (Figure 8), increase the likelihood that the plume
will bypass the protected zone Wp, thus reducing the
probability of failure. Small temporal fluctuations likewise
reduce the probability of failure, but through a different
mechanism. This mechanism is that either small variances
or long correlations ensure that the plume does not deviate
much from its mean trajectory, increasing its chances of
being intercepted by the reactive barrier. Thus, because of
these two mechanisms the probability of failure first
increases, peaks and then decreases between these two
extreme regimes.
[55] Finally, dependence of the probability of remediation
effort failure on lP3, the normalized distance a plume that
bypassed the remediation barrier has to travel before it
reaches the protected zone, is shown in Figure 9. The
Figure 4. Dependence of probability of failure of the
remediation effort on the distance between the source of
contamination and the reactive barrier.
Figure 5. Dependence of probability of failure of the
remediation effort on the length of the reactive barrier.
Figure 6. Dependence of probability of failure of the
remediation effort on the normalized time t^* that is required
for natural attenuation to succeed.
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behavior is analogous to that in Figure 6 as the proba-
bility of failure rapidly drops from one asymptote to
another once the distance traveled is greater than some
critical value. The behavior for lP2 is similar.
7. Summary and Discussion
[56] We used a rigorous probabilistic risk assessment
(PRA) to estimate the probability of the potential failure
of a permeable reactive barrier to prevent contamination of a
protected region located down gradient from a contaminant
plume. (Other remediation techniques can be analyzed in a
similar manner.) The methodology consists of defining a
fault tree specifying all the potential options that can lead to
failure of a specified remediation techniques. Then the
probability of remediation failure can be broken into indi-
vidual probabilities (either conditional or unconditional)
that are combined through Boolean operators. Our analysis
leads to the following major conclusions.
[57] 1. PRA provides a probabilistic description of a
complex reactive transport phenomenon and can be used
to analyze rare events. This is in contrast with a vast majority
of existing stochastic analyses, including Monte Carlo
simulations, which predict the mean behavior of a system
and quantify predictive uncertainty through corresponding
(co)variances.
[58] 2. PRA facilitates uncertainty quantification by
taking a system’s approach in which a complex system
with many uncertain parameters is subdivided into a set of
constitutive components (basic events), each of which has
fewer parameters.
[59] 3. The derivation of our analytical estimate of the
probability of failure of a remediation effort required some
level of abstraction. This estimate can be refined by con-
ducting numerical analyses of the system’s components.
Numerical tools one would employ for such analyses
(Monte Carlo simulations, particle tracking, etc.), become
much more tractable because of significant reductions in the
number of uncertain parameters and degrees of freedom.
[60] In addition to operational advantages, PRA acts as a
translator of information between scientists, engineers,
investors, politicians and decision makers. Each expert
can work within their area of expertise and work on their
‘‘branch’’ of the problem without having to understand the
complexities of the whole problem. The results of such an
approach can then be used in the context of a decision
support system (DSS) [Bedford and Cooke, 2003] that uses
decision theory [Berger, 1980; Anand, 2002] to aid proper
decision making. More importantly, a probabilistic risk
assessment poses directly the problem in an uncertain
perspective, which allows it to account for uncertainties
inherent to subsurface environments.
[61] The presented PRAcan be further refined by accounting
for additional sources of uncertainty, including the existence of
several competing conceptual models, spatial heterogeneity of
hydraulic parameters and the spatial distribution of reactive
material within the barrier itself. Such extensions would
require additional advances in stochastic analysis of subsur-
face flow and transport, as well as in data assimilations.
Figure 7. Dependence of probability of failure of the
remediation effort on the uncertainty about temporal
fluctuations of mean hydraulic gradient, as quantified by
standard deviation of velocity sv.
Figure 8. Dependence of probability of failure of the
remediation effort on the Kubo number k.
Figure 9. Dependence of probability of failure of the
remediation effort on the normalized distance a plume that
bypassed the remediation barrier has to travel before it
reaches the protected zone.
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